For the inaugural Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial lecture, which he delivered at New Delhi in 1967, Patrick Blackett chose the theme "Science and Technology in an Unequal World."
1 It was an apt decision. Throughout his active public life, Jawaharlal Nehru thought that the key to comprehensive economic development in India lay in applying the results of scientific and technological enquiry to the problems confronting Indian society. 2 At the same time, he understood that India's own scientific and technological base could not put forth the effort required. pendent India, Nehru thus confronted the problem of identifying, and then accessing, foreign sources of technology. This raised complex issues quite distinct from the technical problems involved in the transfer of technology. 4 While Nehru's experience as a nationalist politician had given him an understanding of the power relations underlying international affairs, the practical issues that might arise in the course of negotiating technology acquisitions could not be foreseen. Reflection on the Indian experience in this area during the twenty years following independence led Blackett to the conclusion that the problems of enabling development through science and technology in this "unequal world" raised questions worthy of special attention in a memorial lecture. 5 This article concentrates on a specific industrial project, and on events that took place over the four-year period between late 1950 and mid-1954. During these years the contours of the postwar world order, both political and technological, began to impress themselves on the Indian leadership. Politically, the defining features of the new world order were the formation of an integrated economic system comprising the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe (the "Second World") and the concurrent process of decolonization, which would lead to the grouping of the "Third World" countries. Technologically, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and later the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), provided unprecedented access to scientific and technological knowledge. This new world order, once in place, greatly expanded the range of possibilities open to countries such as India. Major decisions concerning broad-based programs of industrialization could now be made with some degree of confidence as to their probable outcomes. 6 As early as 1946, a year before independence, the Government of India began to explore the possibilities of manufacturing pharmaceutical products, particularly those related to the prevention and treatment of communicable diseases. In 1946 and 1948 technical teams visited plants in Western Europe and North America and recommended the manufacture of peni-4. Baldev Raj Nayar, India's Quest for Technological Independence, 2 vols. (New Delhi, 1983) .
5. In 1968, the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which met in New Delhi, signaled both the general recognition of the issue and a process of formulating guidelines to help other countries likewise asymmetrically placed in the international market for technology. H. D. Shourie, UNCTAD-II: A Step Forward (New Delhi, 1968) .
6. In the Indian case, this was most apparent in the substantially more ambitious objectives of the Second Five-Year Plan , as compared to those of the first plan .
cillin (then the best available antibiotic), proguanil (used in the treatment of malaria and filaria), and three sulfa drugs developed to combat diseases of the respiratory tract and the intestines. 7 In January 1949, the government examined these recommendations and decided to set up a public sector corporation to produce these drugs. 8 As the Government of India and the Government of the State of Bombay had jointly sponsored the project, a Committee on the Penicillin Project was established in April 1949 to represent the interests of both governments. By the end of 1950 serious differences over strategy had emerged within the committee, and Jawaharlal Nehru intervened directly in the project. 9 This intervention would lead to momentous decisions concerning the strategy underlying the acquisition of technology by corporations in the Indian public sector. * * * In the years immediately following the Second World War, Indian entrepreneurs sought foreign technical collaboration in establishing new industrial enterprises. They were disappointed to find such collaboration unavailable except in exchange for part ownership in the new firms. With the experience of colonial subordination still vivid, this type of arrangement met with resistance from Indian industrialists. 10 Fortunately for them, the new government supported a policy of developing domestically owned and managed companies and introduced strict import controls to limit the supply of foreign goods to the Indian market. When the threat of industrialization based on import substitution became reality in later years, firms in the advanced industrial countries faced the prospect of seeing their products excluded from the Indian market altogether. In this situation, they found it expedient to license their products and their processes to Indian firms. Many Western companies agreed to license technology, without reserving ownership rights, in exchange for royalties or lump-sum payments. These agreements were always reached after hard bargaining, and, since they occurred in an ill-defined market for technology, their details invariably depended on the specific nature of the technology in question, the availability of possible substitutes, and the negotiating skills of the parties involved.
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This strategy may be observed in the actions of Pfizer, Glaxo, and Merck in the case of penicillin manufacture. During the first, relatively noncontroversial, months following the establishment of the Committee on the Penicillin Project, these firms offered proposals for collaboration that differed in important ways. Glaxo proposed to import pure penicillin in bulk and to use Bombay as a base for bottling therapeutic doses of the drug. Pfizer offered the government the option of importing crude penicillin in bulk, to be refined and subsequently formulated in India.
12 Merck offered to collaborate in establishing a manufacturing facility, a major advance on the other two proposals, although the exact terms under which the transfer of technology would occur were not disclosed.
While negotiations went on with these three pharmaceutical firms, UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO) brought a new proposal for penicillin manufacture to the government. This proposal, which envisaged the development of an antibiotic research and training center linked to the manufacturing facility, challenged the prevailing wisdom concerning feasible methods of establishing a manufacturing base by raising the possibility of accessing technical know-how itself rather than depending on licensed production. K. C. K. E. Raja, the director general of health services for the Government of India, had held initial discussions with UNICEF, after which UNICEF officials met with the Committee on the Penicillin Project. The committee then sought to obtain WHO's approval for the scheme, as the organization responsible for providing technical advice to UNICEF. A memorandum was prepared and sent to UNICEF, while Raja agreed to take up the matter with WHO officials in Geneva. There, N. L. Macpherson of WHO told him that the organization could not recommend any project involving a commercial concern. This effectively ruled out licensed manufacture. Macpherson suggested that the government ignore the proposed agreement with Merck, and gave assurances that WHO could provide all the needed technical know-how and assistance. 13 G. more, he thought that anyone who did have such experience would be legally prohibited by the terms of their previous employment from disclosing information. Sankaran contended that it was essential to gain experience in working in a large-scale plant, and that therefore the government should agree to collaborate with Merck. Raja suggested that Sankaran go to Geneva to argue the technical points, as he himself was not competent to do so. Although the committee agreed, permission from Nehru himself was required to go abroad on official business, and when Nehru was approached he refused to grant it.
14 Licensed manufacture had by this time become precisely the option preferred by industrialists. Neville N. Wadia, chair of the Committee on the Penicillin Project and head of the family-owned textile firm Bombay Dyeing, thought that Nehru's decision deprived the committee of the opportunity to obtain detailed information on the basis of which the government could be properly advised about the relative merits of the Merck and UNICEF/WHO proposals. Wadia therefore wrote to Nehru asking him to intercede to ensure that whatever organization eventually undertook the penicillin project was registered as a corporation in the public sector, in which case its board of directors would be free to act except in matters of major policy. 15 This was a situation that Nehru would presumably have wished to avoid. For if he accepted Wadia's recommendation, the strategy of establishing a manufacturing base through licensed collaborations, favored by Bombay's big industrialists, might also set the pattern for public sector corporations. That pattern would then determine the degree of technical knowledge actually transferred in future public sector projects.
A month later, the terms of the UNICEF/WHO proposal were made clear. UNICEF would provide a grant of $850,000 to the Government of India to equip a penicillin factory, while WHO would contribute $350,000, also in the form of a grant, for technical personnel to design the plant, supervise construction, establish operations, and train scientists, engineers, and technicians. The Government of India, for its part, would agree not to establish links between the plant and commercial firms that might wish to keep manufacturing methods secret and, furthermore, would agree to operate the plant as part of a network of international antibiotics research and training centers that UNICEF and WHO were in the process of establishing.
This proposal was first conveyed to Nehru in a letter from Santokh 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. Wadia had no obvious credentials to recommend him for the position of chair except that he was president of the Bombay Millowners Association, the most cohesive and powerful bloc of industrialists; the government's decision to name him as chair was apparently made to ensure that major industrialists' interests were represented on the committee. Singh Sokhey, assistant director general of WHO. 16 The Committee on the Penicillin Project believed that the UNICEF/WHO proposal would mean a delay of a year, a belief that Sokhey considered mistaken. On the contrary, he asserted that WHO could complete the project more quickly than would be possible for the committee working in collaboration with Merck. Sokhey also pleaded with Nehru not to permit the government to agree to pay royalties to Merck, which would amount to at least $175,000 per year for fifteen years, and asked that he instruct Neville Wadia, who was in New York negotiating with the firm, not to commit India to an arrangement that would preclude financial and technical aid from the United Nations.
In early December 1950, a letter to Nehru from the director general of WHO, Brock Chisholm, officially confirmed that, in addition to $850,000 from UNICEF for equipment, $350,000 would be available from WHO under the UN Technical Assistance Fund. 17 Chisholm reiterated UNICEF's position that, because the penicillin plant would be part of a worldwide research and training program, it could not become involved with any commercial firm that would seek to restrict information about the manufacturing processes used there.
18 Indeed, the assurances given on behalf of the government as to this point by K. C. K. E. Raja had influenced the UN's decision to grant the funds. Chisholm's letter also noted that WHO experts discounted the idea that commercial firms could provide superior technical knowledge. The organization felt that any slight advance pioneered by one company would be matched within weeks by others, and expected that the new venture would, as it gained experience, prove its own efficiency in the same way and eventually produce knowledge of value even to private sector companies. Chisholm concluded by linking action on the UNICEF grant to submission of a formal request from the Government of India to WHO.
As Sokhey had surmised, the project symbolized the role that United Nations' agencies were staking out in the postwar world. In a letter to Amrit Kaur, the minister of health and one of his confidants, Nehru made it clear 18. "The WHO also proposed that production plants receiving international assistance should be ready to exchange knowledge and personnel with other production centres and the International Research Group being developed by WHO. Stress was laid upon avoiding any situation which would lead to the production centre restricting information concerning any of its technical developments. Each production centre should essentially become a training ground for other plants." Report of the Executive Board of UNICEF Apportioning $850,000 to the Indian Antibiotics Plant, excerpted in Estimates Committee, Twenty-Seventh Report (n. 7 above), app. 5, 40.
that he was not convinced that Merck was the sole source of particular patented processes. 19 He was sure that UNICEF and WHO had people competent to advise the government-or, at the least, who could themselves negotiate with Merck. As he was about to leave for England he advised Kaur that although he felt that the government could not refuse the WHO proposal, the decision should be taken after Wadia's return from New York, without waiting for Nehru's own return from England.
As K. C. K. E. Raja, the most senior technical official in the Ministry of Health, later commented, Nehru's reply to Chisholm in December 1950 had more or less committed India to accept the UNICEF/WHO proposal. 20 Why, then, when both the minister for health and the prime minister himself favored the proposal, did it take the government another four months to formally approve it? The answer lies in two factors: the provisions of the Patents Act that permitted preemptive filing of patents to prevent the growth of competitive manufacturing facilities, and Neville Wadia's hostility toward UNICEF and WHO.
In Sokhey's view, Wadia, who did not perceive the technological implications for self-reliance underlying the UN agencies' initiative, was swayed by the salesmanship of the pharmaceutical companies. To counter their influence, Sokhey intended to bring Ernst Boris Chain, Nobel laureate and professor of biochemistry at the Instituto Superiore di Sanita in Rome, and N. L. Macpherson of WHO to meet with Nehru in London in early January 1951. 21 He saw no purpose in writing letters to officials in Delhi indifferent to the issues involved.
Wadia returned to India with the terms on which Merck was prepared to collaborate. Learning of this in London, Nehru sent a telegram to Chintaman D. Deshmukh, his finance minister, suggesting that the government make no commitments to Merck until a meeting could be held to discuss and settle the issues. Deshmukh replied that while the advantages of the UNICEF/WHO offer were clear, there was a commitment to return the financial assistance in the form of free supplies of penicillin to WHO. 22 This obligation had to be weighed against the advantages of collaborating with a firm of Merck's reputation. He suggested that Sokhey be invited to the meeting in New Delhi, at which the merits of the two schemes would be Nehru replied to Deshmukh by telegraph that he was convinced the WHO offer must be accepted. 23 The project had the support of the United Nations, and while the reputation of WHO was visibly at stake, as an organization it had no particular interest to promote. Furthermore, the scientists who had first discovered the process of concentrating penicillin (presumably Nehru meant Howard Florey and Ernst Chain) supported WHO, as did others with experience building large production complexes and research laboratories. The project promised to open new avenues of collaboration, too, contributing to India's development as an international center for research and production. A sign of the prestige of UNICEF and WHO in these early postwar years was the United States Department of State's promise to give special priority to the purchase and export of the capital equipment needed for the project. 24 All that the UN required of India in return was an open door scientific policy and a commitment to supply penicillin at no cost to Indian children through publicly funded health programs. 25 Nehru pointed out that, under the circumstances, India risked alienating the scientific world if it opted instead to collaborate with Merck. An indication of the possible repercussions came when Wadia sent a questionnaire to WHO that offended some of the organization's senior staff. Particularly inappropriate, in Nehru's view, was Wadia's demand that Chisholm personally guarantee the performance of the penicillin plant. 24. In contrast, the State Department rejected Chain's recommendation that some plants in eastern and southern Europe, which had been supplied by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, be permitted to purchase Podbielniak separators manufactured in the United States. Ronald W. Clark, The Life of Ernst Chain: Penicillin and Beyond (New York, 1985) .
25. In the agreement ultimately reached between the Government of India and UNICEF/WHO, clause 8 of section 2 read: "The Government will collaborate with the [World Health] Organization on technical process methods, to exchange knowledge and personnel with other production centres and the International Research Group being developed by the [World Health] Organization and to accept trainees from other countries." Clause 10 of the same section read: "In accordance with the conditions set forth in the action of the Executive Board of UNICEF the Government will undertake to provide, free for distribution to children and pregnant and nursing mothers in India not less than $850,000 of penicillin computed at the cost of production, to be made available in five equal annual installments beginning one year after production reaches 400,000 mega units per month. Distribution will be made, as with other UNICEF supplies, on a Plan to be agreed between UNICEF and the Government. debates with commercial firms, Sokhey did travel to India in early February 1951 to provide any information that might help the government's deliberations. With both Nehru and Sokhey in New Delhi, a series of meetings took place between the most senior government ministers and officials from WHO and UNICEF. In the course of preparing for the first of these, Nehru came to realize that the tenacity with which those who opposed collaboration with the UN did so arose not only from differences of opinion over how best to manufacture penicillin. For that opposition confirmed that the project's implications reached beyond general issues of technology policy and the form of public sector intervention in industrial development, in contrast to what Nehru himself had thought earlier. 27 Nehru understood that UNICEF and WHO drew their influence from their broad international support. Once organizations of this stature backed a project, there could be no question of their failing in the effort. Indeed, considerable odium would attach to a decision against the WHO project. This thought was reinforced by Nehru's strong reservations about the wisdom of involving the government in collaboration with large transnational corporations, especially in the sensitive area of pharmaceuticals.
It is worth noting, by way of comparison, that in two large-scale civil engineering projects, the Bhakra Nangal Dam in Punjab and the tunnel linking Jammu with Srinagar, Nehru opted to hand control to foreign firms or engineering consultants. In contrast to his position on the penicillin project, Nehru wrote:
I am anxious and eager to help Indian firms and Indian engineers and technicians and not to have foreign firms undertaking major works in India where they can be dispensed with. But I am quite clear in my mind that the most important test is the experience of the firm and their technical competence. In relatively small projects special experience might not be needed, but in a large project that experience is of the first importance. If it is clear that the foreign firm has this experience and technical competence then I would choose that firm almost regardless of other factors. 28 Foreign civil engineering assistance passed muster, but collaboration in a manufacturing enterprise, Nehru evidently felt, entailed continuing political subordination. He based this distinction on the difference in degree of technological knowledge possessed by the foreign technology supplier and the Indian recipient in the case of manufacturing. Mere acquaintance with the successful operation of a manufacturing enterprise did not imply that this knowledge gap had been filled. In contrast, Indians involved at senior 29 levels in civil engineering projects could reasonably expect to absorb the engineering skills brought to bear on them.
Nehru emphasized the reality that transnational corporations were "tough" and could well attempt to influence the direction of research in India. As he described his most fundamental concern:
We have built up a considerable number of laboratories and I have specially laid stress on research and the scientific approach, rather than the commercial approach to scientific problems. The commercial approach can pay dividends in a country like the U.S. where the whole basis of the social structure is commercial and individual profit making. We cannot emulate the U.S. in this and have to find a different way, a way in which the State takes a large hand and science has free play. To some extent, this free play of science is limited by the buying up of talent by commercial firms for their own advantage. We become parties to this latter process, if we try to develop under the aegis of a big foreign commercial firm.
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Nehru's essential point was that a distinction had to be made between the research priorities set by an industry and those set by an individual firm within that industry. The issue was further complicated if the firm was part of a transnational group, whose aims might reflect very narrow considerations. In the letter to Deshmukh from which the quote above is taken, Nehru also remarked that during his visit to England he had heard complaints at the most senior levels of government that British decision-making autonomy had been curtailed by compromises made with large American multinationals. He was concerned that the planning process in India remain as free as possible from such constraints. Nonetheless, he recognized that the industrialists did not all share this view; he ended by suggesting that the Government of India disengage from the Government of Bombay, which was clearly being pulled in a direction contrary not only to Nehru's own vision of development of the pharmaceutical industry but to the very path of national development itself.
Sokhey returned to Geneva from India in March 1951 by way of the Instituto Superiore di Sanita in Rome, where he met with Chain. In a letter recording the results of their discussions, Chain emphasized that chemical microbiology was a new and expanding field of biochemistry, in which India had a right to expect to play a major part. 30 For this to happen, however, would require a research facility attached to an antibiotics production plant. "Production of antibiotics will stimulate research problems in all 31. Ibid. 32. Although Chain was correct in writing that commercial production by the "surface culture" method amounted to a direct scaling up of the laboratory techniques used in the pioneering work at Oxford, that did not accurately describe the contemporary state of commercial-scale technology. Chain had not accompanied Howard Florey and Norman Heatly, another member of the Oxford team that had demonstrated the therapeutic value of penicillin, on their 1941 trip to the United States and Canada to generate support for developing methods of large-scale production of penicillin. As early as 1945 it had become evident that deep fermentation in large tanks was far more efficient than the surface-culture method used in the Oxford laboratory trials and in scaled-up wartime production in England. aspects of the field of chemical microbiology, and vice versa, advances in research will be reflected immediately on the production capacity of the plant." He continued: "It is obviously essential that conditions be created in this research laboratory in which the Indian workers can carry out their tasks in a scientific atmosphere free from commercial secrecy and in close collaboration with scientists in other countries." These conditions could be ideally met if the government accepted the UNICEF/WHO offer of collaboration, and "cooperate[ed] with the International Research Laboratories linked with WHO."
The question of patents had arisen at various points in the course of evaluating the UNICEF/WHO proposal. With larger political considerations seeming to favor the United Nations over Merck, the manufacturing processes began to come under scrutiny. For Nehru and his cabinet, there were three issues to be comprehended: the distinction between a secret process and a patented one; whether effective patent protection existed anywhere for the key processes involved in penicillin manufacture; and whether patents filed under existing Indian patent law were legally enforceable. Chain, in his letter to Sokhey following their March meeting in Rome, dealt with the second and third of these. The essential steps involved in the extraction of penicillin, which formed the basis for large-scale manufacture, had been described in papers coauthored by Chain himself and published in Lancet and the British Journal of Experimental Pathology ten years previously. 31 Chain did not think that any patents in the penicillin field were enforceable, though this would depend on the legal structure in specific countries. To the best of his knowledge no case had been upheld by the courts anywhere, though this was obviously a matter for patent lawyers to assess. 
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VOL. 45 342 briefed on the issues and to give his views. 33 Mellanby saw two major points for decision: first, whether the WHO team, led by Macpherson, would be able to complete the project successfully; second, whether the manufacture of penicillin was sufficiently well understood and standardized that no lack of tacit knowledge would threaten to derail production. Mellanby came away from a meeting with Macpherson in Bombay confident that Macpherson could successfully complete the task, if he was the leader of the team. 34 Mellanby gave no details concerning how he reached the conclusion that Macpherson was not only competent to oversee the building of a largescale penicillin plant but also able to do so without infringing on any commitments to maintain commercial secrecy, a particularly critical issue given the postwar experience of British firms. 35 And, in fact, Sankaran had raised precisely these issues to the Committee on the Penicillin Project in arguing that collaboration with a large-scale commercial organization was the only feasible method of initiating penicillin production. But wartime efforts to improve production methods and the particulars of Macpherson's earlier career provide the basis for comprehending Mellanby's confidence.
The development of commercially viable production processes for penicillin centered on the Northern Regional Research Laboratories of the United States Department of Agriculture, in Peoria, Illinois. These efforts, however, took place under wartime conditions, which included pooling the results of production-oriented research at both university and corporate laboratories, a system of cooperation coordinated by the War Production Board. 36 The Connaught Medical Research Laboratories at the University of Toronto were one of two Canadian organizations included in this research pool. 37 Before joining WHO in 1951, Macpherson had worked at the Connaught Laboratories as a chemical technologist, where he gained experience with large-scale production of penicillin; he had, in fact, been the chief initiator of the submerged-culture process there, for which he also 38. This enabled the Connaught Laboratories to cooperate with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in training technologists from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy, and the Soviet Union, and to provide construction plans and operational know-how for plants in those countries; Defries, The First Forty Years, 192-93. Ernst Chain was subsequently commissioned by UNICEF to visit these plants and suggest improvements in their operations; Clark (n. 24 above), 101, 109, 118, 122, 125-26.
39. According to Sokhey's later account, this visit allowed them to gain enough expertise to design a plant suitable to Indian conditions, and this design was sufficiently well conceived for it subsequently to be endorsed by WHO. S. S. Sokhey, "Self-Sufficiency in Modern Medicines-An Imperative Need," Economic Weekly 9 (January 1958).
40. Mellanby to Nehru, 23 March 1951 (n. 33 above). Mellanby knew that Macpherson had the capability to establish a penicillin plant; similar hands-on experience, free of the constraints of commercial secrecy, was not available in the case of other pharmaceuticals.
41 designed the equipment. Research at the Connaught Laboratories had led to the development of a specific strain of mold, and to a unique method of crystallizing penicillin. Thus, although the Connaught production technology drew on the work of the wartime research pool, the laboratories had developed expertise in the entire production chain. 38 Sokhey and a colleague from the Bombay-based Haffkine Institute had visited the Connaught Laboratories shortly after the end of the war and been trained there in the design of penicillin plants. 39 Mellanby warned that the process of penicillin production remained full of technical snags. But these were not insuperable, and the project would in any case benefit from the expertise provided by WHO. Mellanby conceded that a facility established with Merck support might well progress more quickly and the penicillin made there might be cheaper to the consumer, at least initially. However, Merck's financial terms (royalty payments for fifteen years and continued financial obligations even after that) seemed excessive. For more complex chemotherapeutic drugs, such as proguanil, in contrast, Mellanby would certainly have recommended association with a Western firm experienced in synthesizing organic chemicals. 40 Macpherson, through the mediation of Mellanby and Nehru, had managed to convince the cabinet of the technological feasibility of the UNICEF/ WHO proposal. However, his meeting with the Committee on the Penicillin Project, on the same visit to Bombay during which he met with Mellanby, did not go well. As Nehru wrote Sokhey in Geneva, the discussion did not cover the points for which the meeting had been called, namely, specifications for the proposed manufacturing processes. 41 During his stay in India Macpherson had examined the patents filed under the Indian Patents Act that might possibly constrain the UNICEF/WHO proposal. were potentially relevant. Of these, Macpherson judged that one was not in fact applicable, two others were doubtful, while the last definitely did cover the penicillin manufacturing process. Some members of the committee thought that more extensive use of patented processes would, in fact, be required. Macpherson was therefore asked to specify the processes that WHO intended to use. He declined, on the scarcely credible grounds that he lacked the necessary time. Nehru was mystified by Macpherson's reticence and frustrated by his inability to bring the state government of Bombay on board. Suddenly, the opponents of the scheme had new energy.
Nehru wrote to Chisholm asking him intervene in what seemed a simple matter of establishing more open communication. This hitch in finalizing the proposal also provided an occasion for Nehru to raise a question concerning the productivity of the WHO manufacturing process. If it proved less technologically and commercially competitive than methods used by commercial manufacturers, Nehru indicated, the Government of India wished to be free to improve the process through alternative, though unspecified, means.
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WHO's response was as acerbic as an agency of the United Nations, of which India was a member, could afford to be. P. Dorolle, deputy directorgeneral of WHO, wrote Nehru to point out that the problem with the Committee on the Penicillin Project had arisen through the committee's uncooperative attitude, not Macpherson's; Deshmukh had had to specifically instruct Sankaran, the committee's technical advisor, even to meet Macpherson. 44 Dorolle admitted that the secretary of the Ministry of Production, A. V. Pai, had asked Macpherson for detailed specifications of the manufacturing processes he intended to use. However, Macpherson had met with Pai, explained the situation, and evidently satisfied him as to why "the drawing up of specifications was not necessary." Dorolle also took up the patents issue. When Macpherson had returned to Geneva in late March, WHO advisors there had reexamined the four Indian patents in question. The application for the first of these, covering the use of corn steep liquor in the culture medium, had been filed on 25 September 1945. But the process had been the subject of a lecture given to the Indian Pharmaceutical Association by K. Ganapathi of the Haffkine Institute on 15 December 1944, which was then published in July 1945 in the Indian Journal of Pharmacy. Prior publication should invalidate the patent-but in any event, WHO planned to use a synthetic medium rather than corn steep liquor. The second process concerned the use of a precursor in the medium. Macpherson had considered this patent doubtful because precursors were used in all methods of penicillin manufacture, and it appeared that the patent holders had not discovered the process. 45 Several firms were known to be using precursors without paying royalties. And, as the substance used as a precursor was a constituent of the culture medium, it was doubtful whether adding an extra amount qualified as a novelty. The third patent pertained to the use of butanol in crystallization. This had been described in an article in the British Medical Journal in January 1945, which had been available in India for almost two years before the patent application was filed in November 1946. 46 Considerations of prior publication applied here then, too. The fourth process concerned procaine penicillin manufacture. However, no patent was valid for a substance resulting from the reaction of a base and an acid. Alternative methods were available, in any case, to produce procaine penicillin, and the fourth Indian patent would not therefore present a hurdle for commercial production.
While WHO's advisors were satisfied that the patent situation posed no obstacle, Dorolle concluded, the organization was also consulting specialists in London on the matter. On the question of productivity, he stated categorically that, using well-known processes in the public domain, production could exceed Merck's projected levels by several times, once sufficient experience had been gained. Dorolle ended with a polite reminder that further delays in approval of the project could lead to the redeployment elsewhere of the UNICEF/WHO grant.
Sokhey wrote Nehru concerning the same matters a week later. He confirmed that patent attorneys in London, familiar with both penicillin manufacture and the Indian Patent Act, had given their opinion that the patents filed in India were not valid and that "no firm could extract royalties by bringing law suits." 47 He also addressed the supposedly secret process that enabled Merck to claim substantially lower production costs, which the company used to justify proposed royalty payments of three to five million dollars. Before joining WHO, Sokhey, as a representative of the Committee on the Penicillin Project, had met in 1950 with a representative of the Swe-48. Ibid. The claim was that Merck used a strain of penicillin that gave a higher yield and a slightly modified medium to double both yield and fermentation time. The rate of extraction was improved because the broth was more concentrated. Although the yield per unit time was little different, the cost of the raw material, the most expensive item in production, was halved. This process had been discovered by W. E. Brown and W. 49. Raja to Kaur, 17 April 1951, pp. 87-92. Raja considered the contents of the letter too sensitive to entrust it to an official typist, and either having no access to a typewriter or being unable to type he wrote the letter by hand and in pencil so as to obtain a carbon copy. dish firm Karnbogalet, with which the Government of India was then negotiating for penicillin manufacturing technology. Karnbogalet had been licensed the Merck technology while these negotiations were in progress. Sokhey's contact described the basis of the Merck process to support Merck's claim to have a unique process. However, the originators of the process Merck claimed as a trade secret, according to Sokhey's contact, were two scientists at the University of Wisconsin, who had described it in a paper published in 1950 in Industrial Engineering Chemistry, a journal readily available in the Haffkine Institute library in Bombay. 48 Two remaining points of controversy required resolution before the Government of India could make a final decision on the merits of the UNICEF/WHO scheme. The first concerned the processes Macpherson intended to use; the second, the production capabilities of the proposed plant. K. C. K. E. Raja was sent to Geneva to clarify the issues.
The most intriguing information Raja obtained concerned the reasons for Macpherson's reticence during his meetings with the Committee on the Penicillin Project. Sokhey asserted that Wadia was on close terms with the management of both Glaxo and Merck, and that any information given to Wadia or the committee would be passed on to those firms. 49 Numerous methods of crystallization were in use for penicillin production. Therefore, if any private firm wished to sue the Government of India, the onus of proving patent infringement would be on the firm. If Macpherson had committed in writing to the processes he intended to use, that information would be crucial to the outcome of any such case. Initially, Wadia, as chair of the committee, had wanted Macpherson to provide the entire committee with detailed specifications. He subsequently modified that request and allowed Sankaran to meet Macpherson privately-suggested, in fact, that if Sankaran were satisfied with the patent position, Wadia would himself support the WHO proposal. According to Dorolle's earlier letter to Nehru explaining the patent situation, Sankaran had given Macpherson the impression that he was more concerned with demonstrating the existence of patents than with addressing the issue of whether they were, in fact, a barrier to the proposal. 50 Sokhey also told Raja in Geneva that Glaxo had supplied the basis for Sankaran's queries to WHO, and asserted that Sankaran, an official of the Government of India, had aligned himself with Wadia and the transnational pharmaceutical corporations. It was presumably for these reasons that Macpherson, in the course of a three-hour discussion with Sankaran at the Taj Mahal Hotel in Bombay, had refused to offer any details concerning the UN project.
The second major point of controversy concerned the productivity of the proposed facility. Merck claimed to be able to produce 600,000 mega units of penicillin a month using six fermenters, whereas Macpherson had anticipated producing 400,000 mega units per month, also using six fermenters. Sokhey asserted, however, that using the process WHO planned to put in place and commonly available strains of penicillin the plant would be able to achieve 1,800 units of penicillin per milliliter, approximately 97 percent of which would be penicillin G, which translated into a production level of 750,000 to 1,500,000 mega units per month-much higher than Merck's projections. Macpherson's original figure of 400,000 units had been a conservative estimate, at which production costs would allow the project to sell penicillin at prevailing market prices. 51 Following his meeting in Geneva with Sokhey, Raja elaborated on the basis for the WHO/Macpherson production figure. 52 The proposed plant would include six fermenters, each with a capacity of 30,000 liters. Fermentation took about seventy-two hours, cleaning the tanks and bringing them back into operational conditions an equal amount of time, which added up to six days for each production round, or five rounds per month, or thirty fermentation tanks per month. Although the classic penicillin strain (Q176) could give very much higher yields (as Sokhey noted), Macpherson's estimate had assumed a conservative 700 units of penicillin per milliliter. Given an operational capacity of 25,000 liters for each tank, gross production would be 525,000 mega units per month. Assuming an extraction rate of 80 percent, that translated into a net production of 420,000 mega units a month, or approximately 400,000. As workers at the plant gained experience, the three days stipulated between each fermentation cycle could diminish and the number of cycles per month increase. If the number of cycles rose enough to yield forty-five fermentation tanks per month-a reasonable aim-that would translate into monthly production of 630,000 mega units.
Raja obtained these details from Chain at the Instituto Superiore in 53. Chain and Sokhey went further: they "ridiculed" Merck's stipulation that the effluent from the plant should be treated to destroy any penicillin strain it might harbor "as a commercial stunt to make the unwary and uninformed accept the fact that they possess a superior strain." Ibid.
54. Draft minutes of cabinet meeting no. 1223/CM/51, 27 April 1951, Nehru Papers, first installment, file no. 82, pp. 296-99.
55. Estimates of the quality and of the degree to which production was competitively organized are more difficult to establish. One indication of the intense competition in the international market for penicillin: there were twelve price reductions between 1951 and 1954-55, and even deliberate dumping of penicillin in Indian cities. The Estimates Committee of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, reported that procaine penicillin was available in India at about a quarter of the price in the United States and about half the English price. Under such distorted market conditions it is difficult to evaluate the implications of the sale of a consignment of Indian-made penicillin at international prices, which were reportedly a little less than the estimated cost of production; see Estimates Committee (n. 7 above), 5, 11. See also U. 
348
Rome, who also told him that Sankaran was not aware of the extent to which penicillin production methods lay in the public domain. Although Raja made it clear that he was not quoting Chain verbatim, Chain's main point seems to have been that the patent issue could not present a barrier to the UNICEF/WHO project because the essential knowledge on which the production of penicillin was based was the result of university-based laboratory research and collective work done under the auspices of the U.S. War Production Board. 53 Equally important, Macpherson, because of his association with the Connaught Laboratories, was in the fortunate position of being free from commercial obligations of secrecy, and at least one explanation for Macpherson's caginess was now available. Armed with this knowledge and other technical clarifications, the government decided to accept the UNICEF/WHO proposal on 25 April 1951. 54 A formal agreement between the Government of India, UNICEF, and WHO was signed in July 1951.
The agreement called for production to begin in December 1953, but this was delayed by about a year. Initial seeding of penicillin took place in December 1954, and trial production began in March 1955. Although monthly production fluctuated appreciably during the first year of operation, by July 1955 the original production target (400,000 mega units a month) had been considerably exceeded, and production reached 750,000 mega units in January 1956, 890,000 mega units in February. It is symbolic of the situation immediately following the Second World War that one of the two University of Wisconsin researchers who discovered the process that substantially increased the efficiency of penicillin production, W. E. Brown, left the university for Merck, while the other, W. H. Peterson, joined WHO's Expert Panel on Antibiotics. It was the type of expert assistance the panel was created to provide that enabled the Government of India to navigate the obstacles to its acquisition of penicillin manufacturing technology after the war-assertions of economic independence by former European colonies, on the one hand, and on the other industrial countries' determination that political independence should not also mean the loss of markets for technology, even if tariff barriers that accompanied industrialization strategies based on import substitution restricted commodity markets. The patent questions that arose during that project illustrate the pressures exerted by transnational corporations to retain markets for technology. Those pressures were not aimed only at a single plant in India; after all, the original UNICEF/WHO project document envisioned a research laboratory linked to a production unit on the one hand and to an international network of research and training centers on the other. Such a scheme struck Edward Mellanby as the best way to start an entire worldwide antibiotics industry "free from any private interest." 56 But without the political skill that decades of experience had given Jawaharlal Nehru, the critical distinction between manufacturing and civil engineering might not have been made. It was the combination, then, of the immediate postwar thrust toward internationalism and the receptivity to these urges that had germinated in India's nationalist movement that made the UNICEF/WHO project a potential exemplar of international cooperation.
The episode also brought to Nehru's notice the skewed focus of existing patent law, which was geared more to maintaining foreign patent holders' monopoly on manufacturing expertise than to providing reasonable rewards for innovators. It was because of his experience with the problems posed by the penicillin project that, the following year, Nehru insisted on modifying the act to ensure that India's industrialization effort was not needlessly entangled in frivolous claims to priority in developing manufacturing processes. It was also entirely appropriate that both the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and the management of Hindustan Antibiotics, the successor to the Committee on the Penicillin Project, played major roles in the reconsideration of the patents legislation in India in the following years.
